



dread the few months in jail which would be meted out to them in punishment. This fear of penal action stems from countless exaggerated tales current in Poland: a youngster who may have drunkenly tried to molest a girl may fear that, if jailed, he will be treated as a political criminal, an anti-regime propagandist or a saboteur. New recruits in the underground may also be army deserters.

5. The great majority of those who live illegally and who hide in the forests of Poland are, therefore, army deserters, common criminals, young men who have committed a misdemeanor, youthful war-time underground assistants - unwitting couriers, ammunition keepers and the like - who continued to associate with the underground and who, since the war have been either unwilling or unable to rehabilitate themselves.
6. These forest underground groups are almost always directed by experienced war-time underground members who now either live illegally under assumed names or who have managed to reappear as accepted citizens while concealing their present interest in anti-regime action. The leaders of such groups are rarely common criminals. Almost universally, the chiefs are motivated by political considerations such as **hatred** of Russia, Polish nationalism, **hatred** of Communism or personal political ambition.
7. The bulk of the Polish civilian population is sympathetic or actively helpful to these quasi-political, quasi-criminal groups. The underground faces opposition from those elements which are either ideologically Communist, a minority, or those which contain political opportunists who benefit under the current regime. The latter are a majority of the group which does not sympathize with the underground. The general support that is given the resistance is attributable to two factors: the miserable economic situation in which the Polish citizen today finds himself and traditional hatred of the Russians. The historical antipathy of Poles for Russian is strengthened daily by the obvious nature of Russian colonization of Poland evident in the flow of Polish goods to the USSR and in pro-Russian propaganda.
8. The Roman Catholic church may play some part in the population's attitude. Consciously or unconsciously, however, the anti-regime feeling of the Poles is much less anti-Communist than it is anti-Russian. Dislike of the governing system would exist even without Catholic support. The Church does, it is true, play an important crystallizing role in the struggle between Communism and Western democratic ideologies; the primary aim of the Church is, however, its own preservation and survival. The scythe of Kosciuszko, symbolic of the uprising of Polish peasants against Czarist Russia, could provide as much ideological appeal for resistance as could the cross of the Church. The spirit which today moves Poles to resist Soviet Russia, as it motivated resistance to Czarist Russia earlier, is not religion but nationalism.
9. The question of whether or not a serious, intelligently-led and strategically-directed underground movement exists in Poland cannot easily be answered. There are signs that such an organization exists, but the average Pole is not aware of it. This may be explained by the security measures which surround the organization's existence and actions. Any advertisement of its existence would only cause the regime to mobilize the total might of its police forces and army to liquidate the organization.\*
10. The following are given as incidents of the existence of underground groups:
  - a) [redacted] it was dangerous for KB. personnel to perform their duties in the western areas of Poland. [redacted] in the counties of Makow-Pazowiecki, Ostroleka and Przasnysz, KB. men always patrol in pairs. There had been recurring incidents of a single KB. soldier either being found murdered or disappearing without a trace. [redacted] in these areas, the underground is strong and that it operates in groups of 12 to 20 men. These groups not only attack KB. and MO personnel, but also conduct actions against Communist agitators propagandizing collectivization and speaking for the USSR; Communist

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collective offices, such as Samopomoc Chlopska, Spoldzielnie Produkcyjne and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne, also provide targets for active opposition.

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- b) The farm population relates with relish acts which tend to discredit government officials. In the forest regions of Suwalki-Augustow-Lapy-Malkinia, peasants brag that pro-regime forces try to be circumspect and conciliatory because they fear underground retaliation against any strong measures in support of the pro-Russian policy.
  - c) Desertions from the army have multiplied. Only this fact can explain the recently sharpened punitive orders issued against members of the armed forces guilty of an infraction of military rules. Unauthorized departure from barracks, even when troops are on their free time, is punished by a three-year prison term. In one known case, a soldier was recalled for a six month supplemental training course: during his period of service, he visited his wife for three hours without permission. For this offense, he was court-martialed and sentenced to two years at hard labor.
11. Generally speaking, the Polish underground is a very disorganized body. There are many people who would like to join or to try to direct it. Informed persons, however, believe that resistance work is useless at the moment, but that "when the time comes", many Poles will join or will help an underground movement.

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Comment: It is believed that the underground was responsible for the following incident: The flow of power to electric trains was suddenly cut off one day in the spring of 1952 for several hours. Trains running on the Warsaw-Pruszkow and Warsaw-Grojec lines halted. Because of this, some 360,000 workers were unable to report for work that day. It is not definitely known whether the interruption was due to sabotage or to a technical breakdown.

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